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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not it is within the province of the Supreme 
Court of Utah to review the trier of fact's 
determination, and, if so, to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the trial court's. 
2. Whether or not the trier of fact erred in determining 
the weight and credibility given expert witnesses, 
and, if so doing, ruled contrary to that to which all 
reasonable minds would have been persuaded. 
3. Whether respondents are entitled to attorney fees by 
reason of appellants' initiating a frivolous appeal. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH BANK, a Utah 
banking corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KEVIN B. and DARLENE J. 
LEANY, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 20,624 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Respondent, Wasatch Bank, acknowledges the accuracy of 
appellants1 "Statement of the Case" which delineated the purchase 
of real property, the execution of a promissory note and trust 
deed in favor of Wasatch Bank, appellants1 failure to meet the 
terms, the declaration of default, trustee's sale, and the 
subsequent trial for deficiency which resulted in the decision 
of the trial court, Judge Ballif, awarding Wasatch Bank a 
deficiency judgment in the amount of $30,466.91, together with 
costs in the amount of $104.38. 
Respondent does, however, take issue with appellants1 
"Statement of Facts." Set forth below is respondent's brief 
2 
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factual summary based upon the trial record; however, areas of 
dispute are addressed in detail within respondent's Argument. 
On the 23rd day of December, 1980, to facilitate their 
purchase of real property located in Payson, Utah, appellants 
executed a trust deed and promissory note in favor of Wasatch 
Bank in the amount of $55,920. (R. 4, 5-8; Exhibit 1). 
Upon appellants' failure to make payments, Wasatch Bank, 
according to the terms of the note, declared due and payable the 
outstanding principal and accrued interest. On May 18, 1983, 
appellant received the Notice of Default from Wasatch Bank. (R. 
101-2). A trustee's sale was held on September 20, 1983. As of 
that date there was due, owing, and unpaid the principal sum of 
$55,396.87, together with interest in the sum of $5,769.81. (R. 
46, 62-63) . On that same date there was accrued as costs and 
expenses in exercising the power of sale the amount of $3,382.22. 
(R. 46, 62-63). The total due as of September 20, 1983, was 
$64,466.91. (R. 59, 63). 
As of the date of the trustee's sale in September of 1983, 
the premises had been inspected and appraised and found to be in 
considerable disrepair which was characterized as substandard, 
inadequate and nonhabitable. It had deteriorated to the point 
that the City or County Health Department would not allow anyone 
to live in it. The mechanical systems, such as plumbing, heating 
3 
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and electrical systems had deteriorated to the point that they 
were inoperable. The cosmetic condition of the home was also 
substandard. (R. 72-74). At the trustee's sale in September of 
1982, Wasatch Bank bid the sum of $34,000. (R. 63). 
Wasatch Bank was in possession of the property from September 
20, 1983, until the time that it was resold in May of 1984. 
Wasatch Bank replaced broken glass, placed locks on the home and 
installed a new roof. (R. 64) . The property was resold on May 
18, 1984, for $31,500. (R. 68). After the resale of the 
property, Wasatch Bank handled the disbursements of funds, which 
were provided directly for the repairs of the property. Wasatch 
Bank disbursed repair funds in the amount of $41,700. (R. 105). 
An action for a deficiency judgment in the amount of 
$30,553.70 was brought by Wasatch Bank against the appellants on 
October 28, 1983. (R. 1-3). On February 26, 1985, the court 
ruled in favor of Wasatch Bank and granted the deficiency judgment 
in the amount sought. (R. 41-42). Judgment was entered on March 
26, 1985. (R. 49-50). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court heard the testimony of four witnesses, 
admitted documentary evidence and made its determination based 
upon its assessment of the weight of the evidence. There existed 
only minor disputes and appellants' witness, upon learning 
4 
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additional information at trial, substantially concurred with the 
opinion of respondent's witness. 
The judge determined that, in any event, the testimony of 
respondent's witness was the more believable. 
The Supreme Court must only determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence supporting the judge's factual findings, and 
is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trier 
of fact. The trial record herein clearly shows that there was 
more than substantial evidence to justify the determination of 
Judge Ballif as the trier of fact. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN APPELLATE COURT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE ITS 
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIER OF FACT AND 
THUS CAN ONLY REVIEW THE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE 
INSUFFICIENCY RESULTING IN AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard of appellate 
review which prohibits the substitution of the Supreme Court's 
judgment for the trial court on issues of fact. 
This court has consistently followed the 
well-recognized standard of appellate review 
which precludes the substitution of our « 
judgment for that of the trial court on 
issues of fact, and where its findings and 
judgment are based upon substantial, 
competent, admissable evidence we will not 
disturb them. 
l 
Fisher v. Tavlor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977). 
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The evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
judgment made, and we should sustain the 
trial court even if we might have come to a 
different decision had we been trying the 
matter. 
Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. RUPP, 532 P.2d 682 (Utah 1975). 
The only determination left to the appellate court is 
whether or not the trial court's factual determinations support 
its legal conclusions and whether there was sufficient evidence 
upon which to base the factual findings. Hidden Meadows v. 
Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). 
It is not [the Supreme Court's] prerogative 
to determine whether the evidence 
preponderated on one side of the other. That 
is a responsibility of the trier of fact. It 
is only for us to determine whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support 
the ruling. 
Reimschiissel. v. Russell, 649 P.2d 26 (Utah 1982). 
Respondent does acknowledge that in matters of equity the 
Supreme Court may review the facts with more scrutiny; however, 
such review is still limited. 
Although this Court may review both the facts 
and the law [citation omitted] we typically 
accord considerable deference to the judgment 
of the trial court due to its advantaged 
position and will not disturb the action of 
that court unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or the trial 
court abuses its discretion or misapplies 
principles of law. [citations omitted] 
Jeppson v. Jeppson, 694 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Furthermore, considerable deference is given to the trial 
judge who was in the advantaged position to see and hear the 
witnesses and even if the weight of the evidence appears slightly 
in favor of the non-prevailing party, the reviewing court cannot 
alter the judgment. 
Although this Court's statement of the 
standard of review of findings of fact in 
equity cases have varied considerably 
[citation omitted] it is most commonly said 
that we reverse only when the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings of 
the trial court. [citations omitted]. This 
principle is well stated in the plurality 
opinion in Nokes v. Continental Mining and 
Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d 
954: 
[T]he finding of the trial court 
will not be disturbed if the 
evidence preponderates in favor of 
the finding; nor, if the evidence 
thereon is evenly balanced or it is 
doubtful where the preponderance 
lies; nor, even if its weight is 
slightly against the finding of a 
trial court, but it will be over-
turned and another finding made 
only if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against his finding. 
In substance, this is the same standard 
applied in those cases which state that we 
reverse only when the trial court's finding 
is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
[citations omitted]. 
In applying this standard, we are mindful of 
the advantaged position of the trial judge 
who sees and hears the witnesses and therefore 
give due deference to his decisions. . . . 
[citations omitted]. 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1980). 
7 
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POINT 
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BILITY GIVEN TO EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SUCH 
DETERMINATIONS CANNOT BE DISTURBED BY THE 
APPELLATE COURT UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MINDS 
WOULD HAVE FOUND TO THE CONTRARY 
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598 (Utah 1983). 
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The matter of witness credibility also falls 
within the province of the fact-finder. When 
there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered 
by the witnesses, the fact-finder must decide 
which account is the most accurate. Then on 
appeal, we must review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party. 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979). 
Judge Ballif heard the testimony of Leonel Castillo, manager 
of the Real Estate Department at Wasatch Bank, Jud Harward, a 
professional real estate appraiser, Don Gurney, also a real 
estate appraiser, and Kevin Leany, the purchaser and appellant. 
All witnesses were subject to proper direct and cross-examination. 
(R. 58). Exhibits included the promissory note, seventeen 
photographs of the premises in question, an additional photograph, 
and an appraisal. (R. 39). At the close of the case, the matter 
was taken under advisement and a decision rendered the following 
day, to-wit, in pertinent part: 
The Court finds the issues herein in favor of 
the plaintiff, Wasatch Bank, and against the 
defendants and finds that the fair market 
value of the real property at the time of the 
trustee's sale did not exceed $34,000 . . . 
the Court further finds that the total amount 
due on the promissory note, including the 
principal balance, accrued interest and costs 
of sale, totals $64,466.91, and that the 
plaintiff herein bid the sum of $34,000 at 
the trustee's sale and is therefore entitled 
to a Deficiency Judgment against the 
defendants for the sum of $30,466.91. 
The evidence presented by the Appraiser, Jud 
Harward, was the most realistic, and which 
the appraiser, Gurnev, agreed with upon 
verification of the costs of repair items 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which were substantially as represented by ; 
Harward upon verification by the witness, 
Castillo, who had paid bills from the bank to-
repair the property in the sum of $41,000 
expended by the bank and $2,000 by the buyer. 
[emphasis added]. (R. 41-42). 
- - I' forth below A » » j^nef 
synopsis :. -:;•>. :>: .* testimony of the witnesses with 
refe? --\& re:^-^: 
T e s t i m o n y •, •. - mil i HI n H I mi i i -ifli iiiinpen a 
r^ -ai estate appraiser for approximate Ly 15 years arid was irecoc) • 
.:>-.-- * • •-•:• < "• ': • American Institute of Real 
Estate Appraisers - I ot his work u iiv> or i.enlHIi 
to bank loam, type properties, (R, 71) j 1) his fair market value 
evaluations were oaseu upon expi irii uuf in i hi oris from true i"'1 iniericam 
Institute Estate Appraisers, upon definitions utilized by 
inurt.j, ainl upon M'IM tiirt?c recognized approaches ot replacement 
i i i s" t" income'1 • and market uaJhius approach tu • ) «i I i l l I 
others, lie thoroughly examined the property in question in M 
i. <, n m , mi in i in i| letec m iiKh-di I mil I I H M P existed functional 
obsolescence with regard to the floor plan, that the Ujilding was 
probably fifty to sixty ypar's -iM, that it was nonhabitable, that 
it had deteriorates to m e pnini, i tiaii i lie i n v unty Heal,!!! 
Departmen -lould not allow anyone f( live there, that the 
plumbi if. i inn uiecttinal systems had deteriorated to the 
point of moperability, that the painting, carpetiiiq and verier a J 
cosmetic condition oi the home were substandard, (H N j ,„ 6) he 
mi 
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determined that it was actually borderline as to whether to 
rehabilitate the home or to destroy it and start with a vacant 
lot; however, he decided that there was some salvageable value to 
the dwelling and thus the "highest and best use" was to renovate 
the property and bring it up to acceptable standards (R. 75) ; 7) 
after examining the property, he also went through it with another 
individual who determined that based upon the inoperability of 
the heating, electrical, and plumbing systems that the unit had 
to be completely stripped down to the shell and built back up 
again, in other words, the mechanical systems were not salvage-
able. (R. 76); 8) it was determined that it would take approxi-
mately $50,000 to bring the dwelling up to a standard of accept-
able housing, (R. 76); 9) he determined that the fair market value 
of the property, once brought up to the requisite standard and put 
in rentable condition, would be $80,000 and, therefore, the "as 
is" value was $30,000, (R. 76-77); 10) it was his opinion that 
the fair market value of the premises as of September 30, 1983, '• < 
was $30,000 (R. 77); 11) he examined pictures taken of the 
premises near September 20, 1983, which pictures were introduced 
as exhibits at trial, talked to two other people who examined the i 
property on approximately those dates, and determined that the 
condition of the property in September of 1983, was virtually the 
same as of May in 1984, and, in fact, the condition of the < 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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were approximately $50,000, then his "as is" appraisal as of 
August of 1983, would have been $20,000, (R. 91); 9) he testified 
that at the time of his appraisal he did not know that the heating 
system had to be replaced, he did not know that the wiring or 
electrical systems had to be replaced, and he did not know that 
the plumbing fixtures needed to be replaced, and that he was 
working under the assumption that such systems would be repairable 
at a fairly minimal cost and that if it turned out they were not 
salvageable, then his estimations were off a considerable amount 
of money, for example, $10,000 in the heating system alone, (R. 
92, 94); 10) he then testified that having received, at trial, the 
actual cost of repair, he did, in fact, agree with Mr. Harward's 
appraisal as to the "as is" value on September 20, 1983: 
Q: Having received and now knowing the 
actual cost figures, and what is 
necessary, as far as the property is 
concerned, would you agree with Mr. 
Harward's appraisal as to his "as is" 
value on September 20, 1983? 
A: Yes. I would agree that it would be a 
lot closer to that than what I used in 
my estimate of the expenses to repair it. 
(R. 95.). 
Mr. Leonel Castillo
 f the manager of the Real Estate 
Department for Wasatch Bank, testified as to the undisputed 
figures regarding the promissory note, the dates, the principal 
balance, the accrued interests, the actual cost of the sale, the 
bid by Wasatch Bank, and the subsequent sale of the property in 
13 
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Wasatch Bank, even the expetL witness for the appellants conceded 
that thp "iv.i Ki'1 value estimated by Wasatch Bank's appraiser • s 
probably tlju most cor ret I. , 
[T]his Court is constrained to look at the 
whole of the evidence in the light favorable 
to the trial court's findings, including any 
fair inferences to be drawn from, the evidence 
and all of the circumstances shown. The 
trial court's findings shall not be disturbed 
unless the evidence is such that a 11 reason-
able minds would be persuaded to the contrary 
Hanover Limited v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
il is dtfciti we i i jiecotjrn zed thdl, t actual determinations which 
involve property values are strictly within the province 
f'K't-finder and th.-'it" there1* need only be "i reasonable basis in 
the evidence tor the Ii inding [with] respect h,i J<-UUIHJI . . . , 
State of Utah v. Tacrcrart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 187 (1967), 
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[T]he trier of fact as the exclusive judge of 
the credit and weight to be given to the 
testimony of witnesses, including expert 
witnesses, is the judge of the effect and 
value of opinion evidence. [citation 
omitted]. Generally speaking, opinion 
evidence as to value usually goes no further 
than to give the court more or less general 
ideas on the subject. From the evidence thus 
received, the trial court must draw its own 
conclusions of value by a process of balancing 
and reconciling, if possible, the varying 
opinions. 
Whether the opinion as to values is that of 
an expert or an owner, the weight to be given 
it is largely dependent on the reasons for 
the opinion and unless the opinion is wholly 
and entirely based on improper considerations 
or incompetent matters, the weight to be 
given the opinion is a question for the trier 
of fact. 
City of Gilroy v. Filice, 34 Cal. Rptr. 368, 221 Cal. App. 2d 259 
(1963); MCA Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp., 103 
Cal. Rptr. 522, 27 Cal. App. 3d 170 (1972). 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES BY 
REASON OF APPELLANTS1 FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
if the court determines that an appeal taken is frivolous, it can 
award just damages of single or double costs, including a reason-
able attorneys fees, to the prevailing party. 
It is respondent•s contention that the appeal undertaken by 
the appellants was unnecessary and frivolous. The decision 
rendered by the trial court was clearly predicated upon the 
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j u d g e 1 ' , in. ii I i in, in I n e i r ul I n I in! I In | nn H e •#»/ •-! P- MI tin-" mush 
advantaged position h:j ..issess the credibility of the witnesses, 
and, in fiict" the testimony offered by the appellants1 expert 
v-.-ness ..ill mot cont licit with the testimony of t hn w 11 nesses for 
Wasatch Bank "The court below committed nn error of law, there 
w a s s i g n i f icriii t HM n U ' i u ' o iipnn will! i r h I'tin I i i MI I i mil t I'UII hi l» i \n i t s 
decision, and the defendants-appellants simply failed to prevail, 
CONCLUSION 
Upon b e i n g piLuuiiuuu n u n i L .ILL.UI I t i \ \ 11 MI I in-1 ti hiuij niuji i e s 
e x p e n d e d by Iml i i j t i h hi ink t o r e p a i r I IIH d e t e r i o r a t e d p r e m i s e s , 
a p p e l l a n t 1.111 iness i q n M | m i l l rpspondent ' s w i t n e s s a s t o t h e 
" a s i s " uii IdiL m a r k e t v a l u e ul t h e p r o p e r t y on t h e d a t e of t h e 
t r u s t e e f s SH I n 1 n a n y e v e n t , J u d g e Ba l I i f , a s t r i e r o f f a c t , 
• 1 t h e I es t . I i t iu i i , MI il Wiinit.i In Biwth " u 11, IIUMSS I Il mure 
believable Appellants" witness admitted to insufficient knowled-
ge regard inq th(=? tcif.il rep] acement 01 cue mechanical systems of 
the unit. . . .. . .:; 
Clear ' the evidence preponderated in favor or Wasatch Bank, 
: . t 111> duty II| ( he Supreme (Yum I I determine unl y whether 
there was sutficient evidence to support the findings of the 
trier of fa>^ " viewing ^oirt <^ rmr>f substitute Its own 
^k;.i . ~ , a g e d p o s i t :i ::) 1: 1 t D 
determine the credibility and weight to be given the evidence. 
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WHEREFORE, the respondent respectfully seeks affirmation of 
the trial court's ruling and seeks attorneys fees for appellants 
frivolous appeal. 
DATED this \y day of October, 1985. 
S. REX LEWIS, and, 
&um& gY^MMS 
DANIELLE EYER DAVIS, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Gary L. Chrystler 
42 North University Avenue 
Suite 4, P.O. box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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